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The Constitutional Rights of a Putative Father to Establish His
Parentage and Assert Parental Rights-In Slawek v. Stroh,' the
Wisconsin Supreme Court expanded the rights of a putative father
with respect to the custody, care, visitation, support and mainte-
nance of his minor child. This decision is in line with Stanley v.
Illinois2 where the Supreme Court of the United States declared
that as a matter of due process of law, the father of an illegitimate
child was entitled to a hearing on his fitness before losing custody
of the child, and that a definition of "parent" which excluded
putative fathers was an arbitrary classification in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Interpret-
ing Stanley, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held in Slawek that a
natural father cannot be denied his parental rights based on mere
illegitimacy and that he must be given actual or constructive notice
along with the right to be heard before his parental rights can be
terminated. This article will discuss Dr. Slawek's assertion of his
parental rights as a putative father, both substantively and proce-
durally, along with the counterclaims of the defendant mother and
child.
Slawek v. Stroh was an action for a declaratory judgment in
which Dr. Slawek sought to establish his natural parentage of
Crysta Stroh, a three year old child, and to obtain a declaration
of his rights with respect to custody, visitation, support and main-
tenance of the child. Dr. Slawek alleged that the mother also
named Crysta Stroh, was unable to support the child without assis-
tance and that, while he was both financially responsible and the
fit and proper person to have custody, he had been denied any
contact with the child. Although Dr. Slawek had requested that the
district attorney for Taylor County commence paternity proceed-
ings pursuant to Wisconsin Statutes section 52.24, the district at-
torney refused to act. The plaintiff, therefore, commenced declara-
tory judgment proceedings in the county court of Taylor County
and then appealed to the supreme court.
In reversing the decision of the trial court, the supreme court
relied on both Stanley and State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social
Services,' a case which had been remanded by the U.S. Supreme
1. 62 Wis. 2d 295, 215 N.W.2d 9 (1974).
2. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
3. 59 Wis. 2d 1, 207 N.W.2d 826 (1973).
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Court for reconsideration in light of the Stanley decision. Both of
these cases, however, involved a putative father's right to custody
as against a state agency, not as against the natural mother. Prior
to Stanley, all jurisdictions, including Wisconsin,' held that the
mother of an illegitimate child had a primary right to custody of
the child.5 In fact, the child's best interest, an essential factor in
any custody proceeding, had often been equated with maternal care
and supervision. Statutes, such as Wisconsin Statutes section
48.84(l)(a),7 which required only the consent of the mother in
adoption proceedings where the child is illegitimate, had been justi-
fied on the grounds that both the child's welfare and the efficient
and effective operation of the adoption process precluded any in-
terference by the putative father. The possibility that the putative
father could, by upsetting the adoption proceedings, deter prospec-
tive adoptive parents and undermine the credibility of adoption
agencies outweighed the father's parental rights.'
This line of reasoning was declared suspect by the United
States Supreme Court in Stanley v. Illinois.' Confronted with this
decision, courts, legislatures and legal commentators have under-
taken the task of defining its limits. On one hand, Stanley has been
given a narrow interpretation confining its application to the pecu-
liar facts of the case. 0 (The plaintiff had lived with the mother of
his illegitimate children intermittently for eighteen years. When the
mother died, the state attempted to deprive Mr. Stanley of custody
of his children because they were illegitimate and despite the fact
that he had developed a familial relationship with them.) Under
this reading of the decision, a putative father must have shown
some undefined degree of interest in his child before he becomes
entitled to a notice of proceedings in which his parental rights may
4. In re Aronson, 263 Wis. 604, 58 N.W.2d 553 (1953).
5. See Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 417 (1964) and also, 10 AM. JUR. 2d Bastards § 60 (1968).
6. State ex rel. Doering v. Doering, 267 Wis. 12, 64 N.W.2d 240 (1954); 1973 Wis. L.
REV. 908.
7. This statute has been recently amended. See footnote 14 infra.
8. See State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services, 47 Wis. 2d 420, 178 N.W.2d 56
(1970), remanded, Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Services, 405 U.S. 1051 (1972); 1971 Wis.
L. REv. 1262; Note, Rights of a Putative Father In Relation to His Illegitimate Child: A
Question of Equal Protection, 22 SYR. L. REv. 770 (1971); 30 OPP ATTY GEN 282 (1941);
Comment, Disposition of the Illegitimate Child-Father's Right to Notice, 1968 U. ILL. L.
F. 232.
9. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
10. See Comment, Protecting the Putative Father's Rights After Stanley v. Illinois:
Problems in Implementation, 13 J. FAMILY L. 115 (1973-74); In re Guardianship of Harp,
6 Wash. App. 701, 495 P.2d 1059 (1972).
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be terminated. Under this narrow interpretation the mother's
rights are still considered primary.
On the other hand, Stanley has been broadly interpreted to
require that all putative fathers be given the same notice and right
to be heard as any parent in proceedings which affect their chil-
dren." In the Slawek decision, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
clearly took this latter viewpoint. The court wasted few words in
recognizing that Dr. Slawek, as a putative father of an illegitimate
child, could constitutionally assert his parental rights in a legal
forum, with all the due process safeguards. According to the ma-
jority opinion, this conclusion is necessitated by the holding in
Stanley:
• . . In Stanley, the supreme court decided two things: (1) That
the denial of a natural father's parental rights to a child born out
or wedlock based on mere illegitimacy violated his constitutional
right to equal protection of the laws, and (2) that the termination
of a natural father's parental rights to a child born out of wed-
lock without actual notice to him, if he was known, or construc-
tive notice, if unknown, and without giving him the-right to be
heard on the termination of his rights denied him due process of
law."2
Having established the validity of Dr. Slawek's assertion of
parental rights, the court then considered the manner in which
these rights were to be asserted. 3 It concluded that in the absence
of statutory provisions, a declaratory judgment was the proper
vehicle for determining parental rights." Wisconsin Statutes sec-
11. 1974 WASH. L. REV. 647; 21 DE PAUL L. REV. 1036 (1972); Comment, Plight of
the Putative Father in California Child Custody Proceedings: A Problem of Equal
Protection, 6 UCD L. REV. 1 (1973); Note, Constitutional Rights of a Putative Father, 41
UMKC L. REv. 334 (1972).
12. 62 Wis. 2d 295, 303-304, 215 N.W.2d 9, 14-15 (1974) quoting State ex rel. Lewis v.
Lutheran Social Services, 59 Wis. 2d 1, 4-5, 207 N.W.2d 826, 828 (1973).
13. See also H. CLARK, JR., LAW OF DOMEsTic RELATIONS, 576-583 (1968) for a
discussion of the various remedies and procedures used in custody disputes.
14. Wis. S.B. 566 (1973 Sess.) recently enacted into law as Wis. Laws 1973, ch. 263,
amended several Wisconsin statutes which affect the rights of putative fathers. For example,
WIs. STAT. § 48.02(11) (1971) was amended to include putative fathers within the meaning
of the word "parent." Wis. STAT. § 48.025 (1973) was created to give a putative father a
procedure through which he can declare "parental interest" in matters affecting children
and, an individual who has filed such a declaration becomes entitled, by Wis. STAT. § 48.195
(1973), to notice of proceeding affecting the child in question. Wis. STAT. § 48A0(1) (1971)
was amended to require the consent of both parents to the termination of their parental
rights and Wis. STAT. § 48.42(1) (1973) provides for a court hearing before these rights can
be terminated. Wis. STAT. § 48.84(3) (1971) was amended to require the putative father's
consent in adoption proceedings.
1974]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
tions 52.21 et seq. were interpreted to allow only the mother or the
district attorney to commence paternity proceedings. 5 Further-
more, a putative father could not compel the district attorney to
commence proceedings through a writ of mandamus because, ac-
cording to Slawek, the commencement of paternity proceedings is
a discretionary act and a writ of mandamus does not lie to compel
an official to perform a discretionary act. The court next consid-
ered the writ of habeas corpus, frequently used in custody proceed-
ings, and concluded that, unlike declaratory relief, habeas corpus
is not well-suited to the continued jurisdiction needed by the court
to enable it to respond to changes in the child's circumstances
which may affect its original decree concerning the custody, visita-
tion and care of the child. Through a declaratory judgment, how-
ever, the court is empowered "to declare rights, status, and other
legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be
claimed."" By granting this type of remedy, therefore, the court
could be more responsive to the best interests of the child and could
fashion further relief as circumstances demanded.
Although the child's best interests were declared controlling in
Slawek, courts frequently vacillate between emphasizing parental
rights and the child's welfare when confronted with a custody issue.
Statutes, such as Wisconsin Statutes section 48.02(11) (since
amended by Wis. S.B. 566, (1973 Sess.)) and Illinois Revised Stat-
utes, chapter 37, section 701-14, (since amended by Ill. P.A. 78-
531 section 1, 1973), which exclude a putative father from their
definition of "parent" afford a rather facile solution to this prob-
lem. Under these statutes a putative father was not considered a
parent and thus had no parental rights. The child's best interests
were always served by granting custody to the mother rather than
the putative father who was presumed unfit. As a result of Slawek
this solution is no longer available. Both parents now have a pri-
mary right to custody and, even if most putative fathers would be
unfit parents, they will now be heard and adjudged on an individual
basis. The fear expressed by Justice Hansen in his dissenting opin-
ion, that in giving the putative father such broad parental rights
the court would lose sight of the child's welfare," is not justified
in light of the majority opinion. The mere right to receive notice
and to be heard is far from being judged a fit parent and the
15. See footnote 14, supra.
16. WIs. STAT. § 269.56(1) (1971).
17. 62 Wis. 2d 295, 319, 215 N.W.2d 9, 22 (1974).
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problem of whether a rapist could now prevail in a custody suit is
an illusory one.18 In fact, since Slawek has resolved the question
of who has parental rights by giving equal status to the rights of
both parents, it is now more likely that the child's best interests
will truly be the controlling issue in every case.19
After concluding that Dr. Slawek must be given an opportunity
to present evidence as to his fitness, the court considered the coun-
terclaims of the mother and the child. The mother's first counter-
claim was rather indefinite; however, the court recognized a cause
of action not unlike those sounding in fraud, deceit and misrepre-
sentation, breach of promise, seduction, and assault and battery.
Ms. Stroh alleged that Dr. Slawek had fraudulently induced her
to have sexual relations with him by declaring his love for her and
promising to marry her. He was married, however, and would not
seek a divorce. In 1970, Ms. Stroh became pregnant as a result of
her relationship with Dr. Slawek, but she miscarried. She alleged
that the doctor had given her injections to induce the miscarriage
while misrepresenting the purpose of the injections to her. In 1971,
Crysta Stroh was born.
Although Wisconsin abolished the cause of action for breach
of promise to marry,20 there still exists the~common law action for
seduction. The court explained that the primary difference between
these two causes of action is that the act of seduction must be
predicated upon unlawful sexual intercourse while in a breach of
promise to marry sexual intercourse is not an element. At common
law the seduced woman was not permitted to bring the action in
her own name nor was she entitled to recover damages for an
injury to which she had consented. Damages were based on the
master-servant relationship and the action could be brought by
anyone who had been deprived of the seduced woman's services. 21
In Slawek, however, the court noted that the master-servant con-
cept is outdated since the property rights of women are now fully
established. Therefore, the court extended the common law action
to allow the seduced woman to bring the action in her own name.
The mother's second counterclaim pled a cause of action for
invasion of privacy. She alleged that the plaintiffs repeated tele-
18. Note, Constitutional Rights of a Putative Father, 41 UMKC L. REV. 334 (1972);
1974 WASH. L. REV. 647.
19. 7 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 159 (Fall, 1972).
20. Wis. STATS. §§ 248.01 and 248.02 (1971).
21. See 70 AM. JUR. 2d Seduction §§ 35-39 (1973).
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phone calls and attempts to see her had invaded her privacy and
had caused her mental anguish and humiliation. Although a cause
of action for invasion of privacy was never recognized in Wisconsin
as such,22 the court cited Alsteen v. GehlP1 as an exception. In
Alsteen, the court recognized an action for the intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress where the plaintiff had suffered severe
mental anguish as a result of the defendant's willful and outrageous
conduct. In elaborating on the elements of this tort, the court said:
Four factors must be established for an injured plaintiff to re-
cover:
(1) The plaintiff must show that the defendant's conduct
was intentional ...
(2) In addition to being intentional, the defendant's conduct
must be extreme and outrageous. The average member of the
community must regard the defendant's conduct in relation to
the plaintiff, as being a complete denial of the plaintiff's dignity
as a person ...
(3) The plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's con-
duct was a cause-in-fact of his injury ...
(4) The plaintiff must demonstrate that he suffered an ex-
treme disabling emotional response to the defendant's conduct.
The severity of the injury is not only relevant to the amount of
recovery, but is a necessary element to any recovery .... 24
The elements of this tort having been sufficiently alleged in Ms.
Stroh's counterclaim, the court affirmed the denial of the plain-
tiff's demurrer to the counterclaim.
Although Ms. Stroh's failure to correctly plead her counter-
claim was effectively amended by the court, the court's brief dis-
cussion of this cause of action has put in doubt the status of the
new tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in Wiscon-
sin. Invasion of privacy has been defined as:
The unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of one's per-
sonality, the publicizing of one's private affairs with which the
public has no legitimate concern, or the wrongful intrusion into
one's private activities, in such manner as to outrage or cause
mental suffering, shame, or humiliation to a person of ordinary
sensibilities.2
22. Judevine v. Benzies-Montanye Fuel and Warehouse Co., 222 Wis. 512, 269 N.W.
295 (1936); Yoeckel v. Samonig, 272 Wis. 430, 75 N.W.2d 925 (1956).
23. 21 Wis. 2d 349, 124 N.W.2d 312 (1963).
24. Id. at 359, 360, 124 N.W.2d at 318.
25. 138 A.L.R. 22, 25 (1942).
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It is clear from this definition that an action could be both an
invasion of privacy and an intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress; however, it is equally clear that neither tort is a subcategory
of the other. Unfortunately, this is just what the Slawek decision
implies when it refers to AIsteen as an exception to the nonrecogni-
tion of the action for the invasion of privacy. The summary manner
in which the issue was disposed of makes it impossible to determine
whether the court is limiting an action for the intentional infliction
of emotional distress to those situations where the defendant's
conduct is also an invasion of privacy or whether it is expanding
the definition of invasion of privacy to include all conduct inten-
tionally inflicting emotional distress. However, the court's heavy
reliance on the language used in Alsteen seems to indicate that its
reference to invasion of privacy was due to the nature of the plead-
ings and the particular fact situation rather than an intention to
redefine the scope of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
Finally, the child, by guardian ad litem, counterclaimed against
her father stating a cause of action for wrongful birth. The claim
alleged that Dr. Slawek fraudulently induced Ms. Stroh to have
sexual relations with him, knowing that he would be unable to
fulfill his promise of marriage. It further alleged that the doctor
could reasonably foresee that a child would result from this rela-
tionship and that the child would suffer mental anguish because of
its illegitimacy. The child, Crysta, therefore, contended that she
was entitled to recover damages from Dr. Slawek for having
caused her to be born illegitimate.
Actions for wrongful birth have been brought unsuccessfully in
several jurisdictions."6 In some of these cases, the child has sued a
third party for having negligently caused it to be born.2" For exam-
ple, in Gleitman v. Cosgrove," the child brought the action against
a doctor who had negligently failed to inform the mother of the
high probability of birth defects in her case, thereby precluding an
abortion. As a result, the child was born with grave defects. Simi-
larly, actions have been brought against pharmacists by the parents
26. See Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 1441 (1968); See also H. CLARK, JR., LAW OF DOMESTIC
RELATIONS, 177 (1968).
27. For example, Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967); Williams v.
State, 18 N.Y.2d 481, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885, 223 N.E.2d 343 (1966); Joyce E. Barrett,
Damages for Wrongful Birth, 77 CASE AND COMMENT 39 (1972).
28. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967).
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of healthy children where the pharmacist negligently dispensed
some other drug in the place of birth control pills." In all these
cases, the courts have denied relief either because they found that
no tort existed, or because of the impossibility of computing the
damages, or for public policy reasons.
In the Slawek case, the action was not brought against a third
person, but against the father. The court conceded that a tortious
act occurred but, relying on the language of Zepeda v. Zepeda,'3
an Illinois case with a similar fact situation, it denied relief:
Recognition of the plaintiffs claim means creation of a new
tort: a cause of action for wrongful life. The legal implications
of such a tort are vast, the social impact could be staggering. If
the new litigation were confined just to illegitimates it would be
formidable ...
It is not the suits of illegitimates which give us concern, great
in numbers as these may be. What does disturb us is the nature
of the new action and the related suits which would be encour-
aged. Encouragement would extend to all others born into the
world under conditions they might regard as adverse. One might
seek damages for being born with a hereditary disease, another
for inheriting unfortunate family characteristics, one for being
born into a large and destitute family, another because a parent
has an unsavoiy reputation.3'
Many legal writers, however, have contended that a cause of
action for wrongful birth is actually quite similar to existing, well-
recognized torts, such as defamation, infliction of emotional dis-
tress, and the alienation of parental affection.12 Furthermore,
computing the damages is no more "impossible" than determining
the amount of money which would compensate an individual for
the loss of an arm or of a reputation-a determination which courts
and juries make daily. The child alleging wrongful birth suffers
actual damages: harm to his reputation, deprivation of a normal
home life, loss of inheritance rights and mental anguish.13 All
29. Szczerbiak v. Fair Drugs, Inc., No. 356-463 (Wis., Cir. Ct. Milwaukee County, Oct.
17, 1969). See also Rieck v. Medical Protective Co., 64 Wis. 2d 514, 219 N.W.2d 242
(1974), where the parents of a healthy child sued the physician for failing to diagnose the
mother as pregnant until it was too late to have an abortion.
30. 41 111. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963).
31. 62 Wis. 2d 295, 317, 215 N.W.2d 9, 21-22 (1974), quoting 41 Il. App. 2d 240 at
pp. 259-260.
32. 49 IOWA L. REv. 1005 (1964); Note, Compensation for the Harmful Effects of
Illegitimacy, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 127 (1966).
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these would be factors for consideration in determining the amount
of recovery. One writer has, in fact, insisted that the courts would
not be making a radical departure if they recognized a cause of
action for wrongful birth:
The most incisive objections to recognition of the cause of
action are based upon public policy and the historical judicial
reluctance to impose a duty where nonfeasance is concerned.
These objections, however, do not necessarily compel the conclu-
sion that legislative action alone would permit courts to recog-
nize the claim. Without great deviation from precedent, courts
could let the bastard recover."
Despite such views, a legal remedy for the illegitimate must await
future developments. For the present, Slawek has determined that
illegitimacy is a wrong for which there is no relief.
The court's decision in Slawek and the legislature's response to
it,31 bring Wisconsin into line with the rulings of the United States
Supreme Court on a putative father's assertion of parental rights.
The possible effects that Slawek will have on custody proceedings
remain to be seen. The necessity for an unwed mother to reveal the
father's identity in order that notice may be given him will proba-
bly be challenged as a violation of the consitutional right to privacy
as was asserted in Griswold v. Connecticut.3 In such a case, the
father's right to notice and a hearing, the mother's right to privacy
and the child's best interests must be balanced and, if the court
continues to move in the direction it has taken in Slawek, the
mother's right to privacy will surely be outweighed.
MARY PAT KOESTERER
Use of a Juvenile's Confession While Under Exclusive Jurisdiction
of the Juvenile Court in a Subsequent Criminal Proceeding-In
State v. Loyd' four youths gained entrance to the home of two
elderly women whom they assaulted and robbed. A Minneapolis
Police Department school liaison officer was assigned to investi-
34. R. Thomas Farrar, Does the Bastard Have a Legitimate Complaint?, 22 MIAMI L.
REV. 884, 905 (Summer, 1968).
35. See footnote 14, supra.
36. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
1. - Minn. -, 212 N.W.2d 671 (1973).
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